Phil 490:

Seminar in Contemporary Philosophy

 

Consciousness and the Self

 

 

Edited by

 

Professor JeeLoo Liu

Philosophy Department

California State Fullerton

 

 

Table of Contents

 

Background I

 

 

1.     David Armstrong, “What Is Consciousness?” In The Nature of Consciousness, (eds.) Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (The MIT Press). Pp. 721-728. [Outline]

2.     José Luis Bermudez, “Self- Consciousness.”  In The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness.  (eds.) Max Velmans and Susan Schneider.  Blackwell Publishing, 2007.  Pp. 456-467. [Outline]

3.     Frank Jackson, “What Mary Didn't Know.” In The Nature of Consciousness, (eds.) Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & Güven Güzeldere (The MIT Press). Pp. 567-570. [Outline]

4.     Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. (ed.) David Chalmers, Oxford University Press, 2002.  Pp. 219-225. [Outline]

 

Background II

 

5.    Peter Carruthers, “Higher-order Theories of Consciousness.” In The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness.  (eds.) Max Velmans and Susan Schneider.  Blackwell Publishing, 2007.  Pp. 277-286. [Outline]

6.    Ned Block, “Concepts of Consciousness.”  In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. (ed.) David Chalmers, Oxford University Press, 2002.  Pp. 206-218. [Outline]

7.     David Chalmers, “The Hard Problem of Consciousness.”  In The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness.  (eds.) Max Velmans and Susan Schneider.  Blackwell Publishing, 2007.  Pp. 225-235. [Outline]

 

David Rosenthal

 

8.      David Rosenthal, “Two Concepts of Consciousness.”  In David Rosenthal, Consciousness and Mind. Oxford University Press, 2005.  Pp. 21-45. [Outline]

9.      David Rosenthal, “Thinking that One Thinks.” In David Rosenthal, Consciousness and Mind. Oxford University Press, 2005.  Pp. 46-70. [Outline]

10.   David Rosenthal, “Introspection and Self-Interpretation.”  In David Rosenthal, Consciousness and Mind. Oxford University Press, 2005.  Pp. 103-131. [Outline]

 

Alex Byrne

 

11.   Alex Byrne, “Some Like It HOT.” Philosophical Studies 86. 1997. Pp. 103-29. [Outline]

12.   Alex Byrne, “Introspection.”  Philosophical Topics 33:1, 2005.  Pp. 79-104.  [Outline]

 

Fred Dretske

 

13.   Fred Dretske, “Conscious Experience.”  In Fred Dretske, Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays.  Cambridge University Press, 2000.  Pp. 113-137.  [Outline]

14.   Fred Dretske, “The Mind’s Awareness of Itself.”  In Fred Dretske, Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays.  Cambridge University Press, 2000.  Pp. 158-177. [Outline]

15.   Fred Dretske, “How Do You Know You Are Not A Zombie?” in Privileged Access and First-Person Authority, (ed.) Brie Gertler, Ashgate Publishing Co, 2003. Pp. 1-13.

 

Jesse Prinz

 

16.   Jesse Prinz, “Mental Pointing: Phenomenal Knowledge Without Concepts.” Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 14, Numbers 9-10, 2007.  Pp. 184-211. [Outline]

17.   Jesse Prinz, “All Consciousness is Perceptual”.  In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. (eds.) Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, Blackwell Publishing, 2007.  Pp. 335-357. [Outline]

 

Eric Schwitzgebel

 

18.   Eric Schwitzgebel, “The Unreliability of Naive Introspection.” Philosophical Review 117, 2008. Pp. 245-273.  [Outline]

19.   Eric Schwitzgebel, “Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs, or The Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief.” (manuscript) http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/ActBel080925.pdf [Outline]

 

John Perry

 

20.   John Perry, “The Problem of the Essential Indexical”. In Self-Knowledge: Oxford Readings in Philosophy.  (ed.) Quassim Cassam, Oxford University Press, 1994.  Pp. 167-183. [Outline]

21.   John Perry, “Myself and I.” In Marcelo Stamm, editor, Philosophie in Synthetisher Absicht (A festschrift for Dieter Heinrich), Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1998, pp. 83-103. [Outline]

 

Sydney Shoemaker

 

22.   Sydney Shoemaker, “Introspection and the Self”. In Self-Knowledge: Oxford Readings in Philosophy.  (ed.) Quassim Cassam, Oxford University Press, 1994.  Pp. 118-139. [Outline]

23.   Sydney Shoemaker, “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness.”  The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 65, No. 19, Sixty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division (Oct. 3, 1968), pp. 555-567.   [Outline]

24.   Sydney Shoemaker, “Self-Knowledge and “Inner Sense”: Lecture I, The Object Perception Model.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 54, No. 2. (1994), pp. 249-269.  Reprinted in Sydney Shoemaker, The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays.  Cambridge University Press, 1996.  Pp. 201-223.

25. Sydney Shoemaker, “Self-Knowledge and “Inner Sense”: Lecture II, The Broad Perceptual Model.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 54, No. 2 (1994), pp. 271-290. Reprinted in Sydney Shoemaker, The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays.  Cambridge University Press, 1996.  Pp. 224-245.

26. Sydney Shoemaker, “Self-Knowledge and “Inner Sense”: Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, No. 2 (1994). Pp. 291-314.  Reprinted in Sydney Shoemaker, The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays.  Cambridge University Press, 1996.  Pp. 246-267.

  David Chalmers

  27.   David Chalmers, “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief.”  In Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives.  (eds.) Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic. Oxford University Press, 2003.  Pp. 220-272.

 

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