Phil 490:
Seminar in
Contemporary Philosophy
Consciousness and the Self
Edited by
Professor JeeLoo Liu
Philosophy Department
California State Fullerton
Table of Contents
Background I
1. David Armstrong, ÒWhat Is Consciousness?Ó In The Nature of Consciousness, (eds.) Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & GŸven GŸzeldere (The MIT Press). Pp. 721-728. [Outline]
2. JosŽ Luis Bermudez, ÒSelf- Consciousness.Ó In The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. (eds.) Max Velmans and Susan Schneider. Blackwell Publishing, 2007. Pp. 456-467. [Outline]
3. Frank Jackson, ÒWhat Mary Didn't Know.Ó In The Nature of Consciousness, (eds.) Ned Block, Owen Flanagan & GŸven GŸzeldere (The MIT Press). Pp. 567-570. [Outline]
4. Thomas Nagel, ÒWhat Is It Like to Be a Bat?Ó In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. (ed.) David Chalmers, Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. 219-225. [Outline]
Background II
5. Peter Carruthers, ÒHigher-order Theories of Consciousness.Ó In The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. (eds.) Max Velmans and Susan Schneider. Blackwell Publishing, 2007. Pp. 277-286. [Outline]
6. Ned Block, ÒConcepts of Consciousness.Ó In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. (ed.) David Chalmers, Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. 206-218. [Outline]
7. David Chalmers, ÒThe Hard Problem of Consciousness.Ó In The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. (eds.) Max Velmans and Susan Schneider. Blackwell Publishing, 2007. Pp. 225-235. [Outline]
David Rosenthal
8. David Rosenthal, ÒTwo Concepts of Consciousness.Ó In David Rosenthal, Consciousness and Mind. Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. 21-45. [Outline]
9. David Rosenthal, ÒThinking that One Thinks.Ó In David Rosenthal, Consciousness and Mind. Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. 46-70. [Outline]
10. David Rosenthal, ÒIntrospection and Self-Interpretation.Ó In David Rosenthal, Consciousness and Mind. Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. 103-131. [Outline]
Alex Byrne
11. Alex Byrne, ÒSome Like It HOT.Ó Philosophical Studies 86. 1997. Pp. 103-29. [Outline]
12. Alex Byrne, ÒIntrospection.Ó Philosophical Topics 33:1, 2005. Pp. 79-104. [Outline]
Fred Dretske
13. Fred Dretske, ÒConscious Experience.Ó In Fred Dretske, Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. 113-137. [Outline]
14. Fred Dretske, ÒThe MindÕs Awareness of Itself.Ó In Fred Dretske, Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. 158-177. [Outline]
15. Fred Dretske, ÒHow Do You Know You Are Not A Zombie?Ó in Privileged Access and First-Person Authority, (ed.) Brie Gertler, Ashgate Publishing Co, 2003. Pp. 1-13.
Jesse Prinz
16. Jesse Prinz, ÒMental Pointing: Phenomenal Knowledge Without Concepts.Ó Journal of Consciousness Studies, Volume 14, Numbers 9-10, 2007. Pp. 184-211. [Outline]
17. Jesse Prinz, ÒAll Consciousness is PerceptualÓ. In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. (eds.) Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, Blackwell Publishing, 2007. Pp. 335-357. [Outline]
Eric Schwitzgebel
18.
Eric Schwitzgebel, ÒThe Unreliability of Naive
Introspection.Ó Philosophical Review 117, 2008. Pp. 245-273.
19. Eric Schwitzgebel, ÒActing Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs, or The Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief.Ó (manuscript) http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/ActBel080925.pdf [Outline]
John Perry
20. John Perry, ÒThe Problem of the Essential IndexicalÓ. In Self-Knowledge: Oxford Readings in Philosophy. (ed.) Quassim Cassam, Oxford University Press, 1994. Pp. 167-183. [Outline]
21. John Perry, ÒMyself and I.Ó In Marcelo Stamm, editor, Philosophie in Synthetisher Absicht (A festschrift for Dieter Heinrich), Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1998, pp. 83-103. [Outline]
Sydney Shoemaker
22. Sydney Shoemaker, ÒIntrospection and the SelfÓ. In Self-Knowledge: Oxford Readings in Philosophy. (ed.) Quassim Cassam, Oxford University Press, 1994. Pp. 118-139. [Outline]
23. Sydney Shoemaker, ÒSelf-Reference and Self-Awareness.Ó The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 65, No. 19, Sixty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division (Oct. 3, 1968), pp. 555-567. [Outline]
24. Sydney Shoemaker, ÒSelf-Knowledge and ÒInner SenseÓ: Lecture I, The Object Perception Model.Ó Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 54, No. 2. (1994), pp. 249-269. Reprinted in Sydney Shoemaker, The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. 201-223.
25. Sydney Shoemaker, ÒSelf-Knowledge and ÒInner SenseÓ: Lecture II, The Broad Perceptual Model.Ó Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 54, No. 2 (1994), pp. 271-290. Reprinted in Sydney Shoemaker, The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. 224-245.
26. Sydney Shoemaker, ÒSelf-Knowledge and ÒInner SenseÓ: Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience.Ó Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, No. 2 (1994). Pp. 291-314. Reprinted in Sydney Shoemaker, The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp. 246-267.