§ Smart's Basic Assumptions:

___ Every organism is a form of physiochemical mechanism.
___ Everything should be explicable in terms of physics.
___ There should be nothing that is "over and above" physical phenomena.
   [Nothing can be "nomological danglers." ]
___ Therefore, a man is a vast arrangement of physical particles, but there are not,
   over and above this, sensations or states of consciousness.

§ Smart's Main Thesis:
___ Sensations are brain-processes.

Read p. 170
Q: What does Smart mean by "in so far as 'after image' or 'ache' is a report of a process, it
   is a report of a process that happens to be a brain process"?
Q: How does it follow that the thesis does not claim that sensation statements can be
   translated into statements about brain processes?

§ Identity

[strict identity]: x and y are identical in the strict sense
   iff x and y are spatially and temporally coexistent.

[Note]:
Pain and pain-behavior do not have strict identity. They may be spatially and temporally
continuous. According to Smart, pain and brain-processes is a different story.

§ Objections and Replies

[Objection 1]
___ The things we are talking about when we describe our sensations are not processes in
   our brain since we may describe the former without any knowledge of the latter.

[Reply]
___ example of the Morning Star and the Evening Star.
___ example of lightning and electrical discharge.
Q: What is his point?
[Objection 2]
___ Our present scientific discovery about the brain could be falsified in the future. So, pain may not be C-fiber firing after all.

[Reply]
___ But this does not show that what we report (having a pain-sensation) is not in fact a brain process.
Q: What is his point?

[Objection 3]
___ the existence of irreducibly psychic properties: the qualities of sensations are something over and above the qualities of brain-processes.

[Reply]
___ the concept of a normal percipient.
___ the example of color: colors are powers to cause sensations in human beings, which are identifiable with brain processes.
___ When a person says, "I see a orange after-image," he is saying something like this: "There is something going on which is like what is going on when I really see an orange."
Q: What is his point?
Read p. 173, and evaluate the strength of this reply.

[Objection 4]
___ 1. The after-image is not in physical space.
___ 2. The brain-process is in physical space.
___ 3. Therefore, the after-image is not a brain-process.

[Reply]
___ There is no such a thing as an after-image or a sense-datum, though there is such a thing as the experience of having an image, and this experience is located in the brain.

[Objection 5]
___ 1. A brain-process can be said to be slow or swift.
___ 2. But the experience of seeing something orange cannot be so described.
___ 3. Therefore, the experience is not a brain-process.

[Reply]
___ 'Experience' and 'brain-process' may in fact refer to the same thing, though they don't mean the same or have the same logic.

[Objection 6]
___ 1. Sensations are private (not-sharable) and infallible.
___ 2. But brain-processes are not.
___ 3. Therefore, sensations cannot be identified with brain-processes.

[Reply]
The language of introspective reports has a different logic from the language of material processes.

[Objection 7]
___ It is conceivable (I can imagine) that I be turned to stone and still have sensations.

[Reply]
___ All the objection shows is that 'experience' and 'brain-process' do not have the same meaning. It does not show that an experience is not in fact a brain process. ___ The identity is a contingent one; it is logically possible that there should be no brain-process while there are sensations. But this does not show that they are in fact not identical.

[Objection 8]
___ The "beetle in the box" objection.  
Q: What is the point here?

[Reply]
___ We can say that the brain processes which are experiences are causal conditions of our reports of immediate experience.

§ Conclusion

1. The brain-process thesis is not an empirical claim.  
Q: Why not?

2. The principles of parsimony and simplicity decide overwhelmingly in favor of the brain-process theory (over dualism).