

Phil 317: [handout #3]
Hilary Putnam: *Brains and Behavior*

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§ Logical Behaviorism [Strong]:

___ Statements containing mental vocabulary can be analyzed into (translated into) statements containing just the vocabulary of physical behavior.

___ Mental events are logical constructions out of actual and possible behavioral events.

§ Logical Behaviorism [Moderate]:

(1) Analytic entailments: there exist *entailments* between mind-statements and behavior-statements;

⇒ If x is in pain, then x would exhibit the following set of behavior (or a major part of it): is moaning, is wincing,

(2) Partial Translatability: Mind-talk cannot all be translated into behavior-talk. The failure of translation is the result of the ambiguity of mind talk.

*Q: What is the difference between strong logical behaviorism and moderate logical behaviorism? Do you think the moderate version makes logical behaviorism more acceptable?

§ Putnam's Notion of "Pain"

___ the *intension* of "pain" cannot be some inner quality.

___ "Pain" is a cluster concept: the application of the word 'pain' is controlled by a whole cluster of criteria, all of which can be regarded as *synthetic* (that is, non-analytic: it is possible to say that the term "pain" applies although the whole cluster is missing).

*Q: What does Putnam mean by this statement: As a consequence, there is no satisfactory way of answering the question 'What does "pain" mean?' except by giving an exact synonym; but there are a million and one different ways of saying what pain is.
(p. 26)

*Q: How exactly is Putnam's notion of pain different from that of logical behaviorism?

*Q: What is his point about polio or multiple sclerosis? (p. 27)

- **Logical behaviorism: "Pain" is a cluster-concept -- that is to say, it stands for a cluster of phenomena.**
- **Putnam: What we mean by 'pain' is not the presence of a cluster of responses; rather, it means the presence of an event or condition that normally causes those responses.**

*Q: Do you agree with Putnam when he says, " One can have a 'pink elephant hallucination,' but one cannot have a 'pain hallucination,' or an 'absence of pain hallucination.'?"

***** Putnam's definition of "pain":**

___ Pains are not clusters of responses; they are (normally, in our experience to date) the causes of certain clusters of responses.

§ Putnam's Goals:

___ I come to bury logical behaviorism, not to praise it.

To Show:

- (i) There is no analytic entailment connecting pain and pain behavior.
- (ii) Statements about pain are not translatable into statements about the behavior of pain,.. because *causes* (pains) are not logical construction out of their *effects* (behavior).
 - ⇒ It is logically possible (no self-contradiction) to have hypothetical worlds in which there are pains but *no* pain behavior.

§ Putnam's Argument Against Logical Behaviorism:

- ___ 1. If 'pain' *means* a cluster of responses such as saying "ouch" or wincing, then it is impossible for anyone to have pain in the absence of this cluster of responses.
- ___ 2. But there can be possible worlds (it is not self-contradictory to have such worlds) in which pains are not responsible for the usual responses, or even are not responsible for any responses at all.
- ___ 3. Therefore, this cluster of responses cannot be the meaning of 'pain.'

Two Possible Worlds:

- (1) The super-Spartans
- (2) The X-worlders

*Q: Do you agree with Putnam that the super-Spartans and the X-worlders do have pains?

§ Putnam's Conclusion:

If this last fantasy is not self-contradictory, then logical behaviorism is simply a mistake.