[Handout 14]

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[Supplementary]

§ Kaplan's Project

### [The semantics of *Direct Reference*]
___ Theories of meaning according to which certain singular terms refer directly without the mediation of a Fregean *Sinn* as meaning. If there are such terms, then the proposition expressed by a sentence containing such a term would involve individuals directly rather than by way of the "individual concepts" or "manners of presentation."

[Directly referential terms]
___ Terms which refer directly without the mediation of a Fregean *Sinn* as meaning.

## § Two Kinds of Semantical Theories

I.   Fregean Picture

The relation between language and propositional content is determined by the conventions or rules of the language – or perhaps by the beliefs of the speaker.

The relation between propositional component (sense) and the individual is, in general, empirical: the individual who falls under the concept, i.e., who, **uniquely**, has the qualities.

The relation between language and the individual is defined as the product of the above two relations.

II.   Direct Reference Picture

The relation between language and the individual is determined by the conventions or rules of the language.

Q: **What terms should be treated as directly referential terms?**
   (i)   demonstratives
   (ii)   indexicals
   (iii)   natural kind terms
   (iv)   proper names

§ Kaplan's Theory of Demonstratives

Samples:
   (i)   'he', 'his', 'she', 'it' (when accompanied by a demonstrative pointing);
   (ii)   **True demonstratives**; 'that', 'this' (always require some pointing)
   (iii)   **Pure indexicals**: 'I,' 'my', 'here' (with exceptions), 'now', 'tomorrow,' 'yesterday,' 'today' (no pointing is required)
   (iv)   'the actual', 'the present'…

* What is common to all these words is that the referent is dependent on the context of use and that the meaning of the word provides a rule which determines the referent in terms of certain aspects of the context.

* Features of the demonstrative:
1. Some of them require, in order to determine their referent, an associated demonstration: typically, though not invariably, a (visual) presentation of a local object discriminated by a pointing.
2. A *true* demonstrative ('this,' 'that,' 'he', etc.) without an associated demonstration is incomplete, because the linguistic rules which govern the use of these terms are not sufficient to determine their referent in all contexts of use.
3. An incomplete demonstrative is not *vacuous* like an improper definite description.

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§ Donnellan's Referential Use of Descriptions vs. Kaplan's Demonstrative

Donnellan's accurate insight into language use:
___ Many utterances do not come complete in and of itself. Speaker's intention and context of use are also important in determining the content of the utterance. We need more than linguistic competence.

Donnellan's insufficiencies:
   (i)   two concepts of 'referential use'

e.g. **(3) The spy is suspicious: (7) << 'The', *S> P>>*
                        (17) Dthat ["the spy"] is suspicious.] → demonstrative**

   (ii)   *Q*: What is 'having someone in mind'? → **Answer: It is having an intended demonstratum**

   (iii)   How do we make a formal intensional logic?

§ Review

[1] The Commonsense Theory (Russell's old theory)
___ A speech act (what a given speaker asserts) involves two elements:
  (1) the individual being talked about
  (2) the property expressed by the predicate
e.g. <u>John</u>   <u>is tall</u>.

[2] The Golden Age of Pure Semantics (Carnap; Frege)
___ Each term has both an extension and an intension

e.g. terms:
___ intension: concepts
___ extension: individuals

sentences:
___ intension: proposition

___ extension: truth-values

Q: **What is the intension of a proper name?**
___ Proper names and common nouns alike have both an intension and an extension. The intension of proper names is a description. (Proper names are disguised descriptions.)

e.g. 'Baker' is a butcher's name;
'Sir Walter' is a dog's name

[3] The New Theory: Singular Propositions Theory
___ Each singular proposition is an ordered couple: <an individual, a property>
[Singular propositions]:
___ Propositions that are expressed by sentences containing directly referential terms would have *individuals*, rather than *individual concepts*, as components.

e.g. 'being suspicious' = p = the function which assigns to each world w and each time t the set of all those individuals of w which, in w, are suspicious at t.

S: being a spy
P: being suspicious

    (1) A spy is suspicious. → (5) << 'A', $S > P >$
    (2) Every spy is suspicious. → (6) << 'Every,' $S > P>$
    (3) The spy is suspicious. → (7) << 'The', $S > P >$
    (4) John is suspicious. → (8) <John, P> (Russell's early claim)

[8] will determine that function F which assigns Truth to w and t iff John is a member of $P <w$, t>.

(9) <'Proper name', $J > =$ John

(10) << 'proper name', J> P> = (11) << 'The', J> P>
___ Proper names play the role of a common noun.

§ **Kaplan's Claims**

    1. **The view of the Golden Age is correct for communication by means of general propositions.**

    2. **But some or all of the denoting phrases used in an utterance should not be considered part of the content of what is said, but should be thought of as contextual factors which help us interpret the actual physical utterance as having a certain content.**

3. **Contextual factors are not part of the content, but help us interpret the content (proposition).**

Q: **How can contextual factors determine that part of the content of an utterance which corresponds to a singular denoting phrase?**

      (i)   **by determining what language is being spoken**

      (ii)   **by determining which of the many persons so dubbed a proper name stands for**

      (iii)   **by demonstration – pointing, which indicates the object for which the phrase stands**

§ Demonstrative Use of A Singular Denoting Phrase
___ When the speaker intends that the object for which the phrase stands be designated by an associated demonstration

(12) He [the speaker points at John] is suspicious.

(13) He [the speaker points at John$_1$] is suspicious.

(14) He [the speaker points at John$_2$]is suspicious.

(12) – (14) express the same proposition.

The varying forms which such a demonstration can take are not reflected in the content of the utterance (the proposition). The demonstration "gives us" the element of the proposition corresponding to the demonstrative.

§ Problem:

* Erroneous beliefs may lead a speaker to put on a demonstration which does not demonstrate what he thinks it does.

e.g. Pointing at the picture of Carnap (when someone switched the picture without the speaker's knowledge)
___ Linguistic competence is simply insufficient to completely determine the content of what is said.

Frege's solution – to incorporate the demonstration in the proposition.
Kaplan: This view is unsatisfactory.

* The intended demonstratum ≠ the demonstratum

                                  What the demonstration accomplishes

§ Dthat (pronounced as one syllable)
___ **the demonstrative use of "that"**

The demonstrative analysis of names	vs.	**the Fregean analysis of names**	:

___ **when to use which depends on the speaker's intention**

(17) **Dthat** ["the spy"] is suspicious.
___ For want of "dthat" some speakers may be driven to utter (3) The spy is suspicious, when they intend what is expressed by (17).

Utterances of
(17) Dthat ["the spy"] is suspicious. $\Rightarrow$ **u**
(3) The spy is suspicious. $\Rightarrow$ **u'**

> **u is a singular proposition.**
> **u' is a general proposition.**

For u (17), the individual in *w'* at t is not the denotation of "the spy" in *w'* at t, but rather the denotation of "the spy" in *w* at t. [fixed in our world.]

The relevant individual is determined in the world in which the utterance takes place, and then that same individual is checked for suspicion in all other worlds.

For u' (3), we determine (possibly) new relevant individual in each world.

§ Eternal Sentence vs. Fugitive Sentence

[Eternal sentence]:
___ Those sentences which do not express a perspective from within a space-time.

e.g. In 1970 American women exceed American men in wealth.

[Fugitive sentences]:
___ Those sentences that do contain indexicals such as 'now,' 'here', 'I', or whose component names and definite descriptions are understood to require contextual determination.

E.g. ambiguous names

Any particular utterance (token) of a fugitive sentence (type) is an *eternalization* of the fugitive sentence. The relativization to time is fixed by the time of the utterance.

< meaning > **= the function which assigns to a time and a possible world the truth value of a given fugitive sentence (type) at that time in that world.**

↓

A function from utterance to contents.

The meaning is common to all utterances of the sentence, and it is one of the components which goes into determining the *content* of any particular utterance of the sentence.

< content > **= the function which assigns to each possible world *the truth value* which the utterance would take if it were evaluated with respect to that world.**

(Kaplan's demonstratives seem to be like Putnam's indexicals.)

We should be able to represent demonstratives as something like functions from world, time, etc., to demonstrata. Thus, just like the meaning of a definite description.

* These two contents must agree in the world *w*, the world in which the utterance takes place.

***Q*: Is demonstration "external"? Does it guarantee the existence of the object?**
A: No, "en rapport" is not necessary. E.g. the first baby of the 21st century.

§ What is Distinctive of Kaplan's Direct Reference Theory?

(1) The directly referential term designates the object directly, not through the association of descriptions.
(2) The object itself, not the descriptive meaning of the term, is part of the propositional content. (The proposition has the object as a component.)
(3) All directly referential terms will be regarded as *rigid designators* in the modified sense of an expression which designates the same thing in *all* possible worlds.
(4) Frege's "cognitive significance" of a word or phrase is to be identified with the "character" – the way the content is presented to us.
(5) A special form of knowledge of an object is neither required nor presupposed in order that a person may entertain as object of thought a singular proposition involving that object.

§ Conclusion

The goal is to incorporate contextual factors (e.g. demonstration) as part of the content of the utterance. Contextual factors are essential and regularly employed in our language learning and thereafter in all forms of communication.